The following cases are recent court decisions that may be of interest to you. Please contact us if you have a question regarding any of the cases mentioned or to request a copy of the complete written court opinion.

SPRING 2025

Yacht Damage Claim Capsizes Over Broker’s Role

TWC Acqua Ltd. v. RFIB Grp. Ltd., No. 23-12100, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 28292 (11th
Cir. Nov. 7, 2024)

In TWC Acqua Ltd. v. RFIB Group Ltd., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a dispute between TWC Acqua Limited (TWC) and RFIB Group Limited (RFIB) concerning a marine insurance policy. TWC, the owner of the M/Y Acqua, filed a breach of contract claim against RFIB, alleging that RFIB failed to indemnify it for water damage to the yacht caused by heavy rains while docked in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in 2017. TWC sought compensation under a marine insurance policy that it purchased through RFIB, which was designated as the broker, not the insurer.

The district court granted TWC’s motion for a default judgment on liability after RFIB failed to respond to the complaint on time. RFIB subsequently appeared, arguing that it was not liable under the policy because it was merely a broker and not an insurer. RFIB further contended that the insurance contract unambiguously designated three Lloyd’s Syndicates as the underwriters responsible for indemnification, not RFIB. Despite these arguments, the district court maintained its judgment, prompting RFIB to appeal.

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s decision, ruling that the lower court abused its discretion by granting the default judgment without properly assessing whether TWC’s complaint stated a plausible claim for breach of contract. The appellate court emphasized that a motion for default judgment requires the plaintiff’s allegations to meet the pleading standards established in Twombly and Iqbal. Here, the insurance policy clearly identified RFIB as a broker rather than an insurer, making TWC’s allegations of breach of contract implausible. The court also found that the district court erred in implicitly construing RFIB as a liable insurer despite the unambiguous terms of the policy.

TWC argued that ambiguities in the policy justified the default judgment, but the
Eleventh Circuit disagreed. The court held that the policy explicitly differentiated
between RFIB’s role as a broker and the underwriters’ role as insurers. Accordingly, RFIB could not be held liable for indemnification. The appellate court vacated the default judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss TWC’s complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

Land-Based Trip Sinks Seaman’s Unseaworthiness Claim

Sanders v. Weeks Marine, Inc., No. 23-cv-7317, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176748 (E.D.
La. Sept. 27, 2024)

The plaintiff, Pedro Sanders, filed a personal injury lawsuit under the Jones Act against his employer, Weeks Marine, Inc., following a trip-and-fall accident on November 8, 2022. Sanders alleged that he was injured while retrieving supplies from a shack at a worksite. He claimed to have tripped over a D-ring, which should have been buried but was exposed, resulting in serious injuries. His claims included negligence under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure, as well as compensatory damages for mental anguish, pain and suffering, and bodily impairment.

Weeks Marine moved for partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Sanders’ claims for nonpecuniary damages and unseaworthiness. Additionally, the defendant filed motions to exclude the testimony of two of Sanders’ expert witnesses: safety expert Robert Borison and economic loss expert Max Lummis.

The court granted Weeks Marine’s motion for partial summary judgment on nonpecuniary damages. It ruled that under maritime law, Jones Act seamen cannot recover nonpecuniary damages, such as mental anguish or bodily impairment, except as related to maintenance and cure claims. Regarding unseaworthiness, the court found that the accident occurred on land and that there was no evidence linking the alleged hazard to a vessel’s condition, crew, or appurtenances. As a result, the unseaworthiness claim was also dismissed.

Weeks Marine’s motions to exclude expert testimony were partially granted. The court excluded Borison’s opinions, ruling that his testimony on tripping hazards was unnecessary because the issues in the case were within the common understanding of lay jurors. Lummis’ economic calculations for future lost wages were excluded because they improperly accounted for inflation. However, the court allowed Lummis 14 days to revise his report using appropriate methodology and permitted him to testify on future lost wages if a proper foundation was established at trial.

This case underscores the strict limitations on recoverable damages under maritime law and the importance of adhering to established legal and evidentiary standards when presenting expert testimony.

Mississippi River Collision Case Runs Aground on Lack of Proof

Riley v. Kirby Corp., No. 23-cv-3119, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187882 (E.D. La. Oct. 16,
2024)

Tony Riley, the owner of the vessel MISS LISA, and Allen Burns, a deckhand aboard the vessel, sued Penn Maritime, Inc., incorrectly named as Kirby Corporation, alleging negligence after a purported collision between the MISS LISA and Penn Maritime’s vessel, the CAPT HAGEN. The plaintiffs claimed that the collision occurred on November 10, 2021, in the lower Mississippi River, resulting in damages exceeding $1 million.

Penn Maritime denied that any collision occurred and filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that Penn Maritime breached any duty of care. To succeed in their maritime collision claim, the plaintiffs needed to establish four elements: duty, breach, injury, and causation. While Penn Maritime acknowledged there was a genuine dispute regarding whether the collision occurred, the motion focused on the lack of evidence showing a breach of duty.

Under maritime law, the applicable standards of care in a collision case derive from prudent seamanship, statutory and regulatory rules, and recognized customs. Penn Maritime argued that the CAPT HAGEN was operating in full compliance with these standards. It provided evidence, including AIS data and testimony, showing that the CAPT HAGEN adhered to the “point-bend custom” long recognized on the Mississippi River. This custom dictates that southbound vessels, such as the CAPT HAGEN, navigate along the bends while northbound vessels, like the MISS LISA, travel closer to the river’s points. The evidence also confirmed that the CAPT HAGEN had the right of way under Inland Navigation Rule 14(d) as the downstream vessel.

The plaintiffs, however, failed to conduct substantial discovery, take depositions, or produce expert testimony to support their claims. As a result, they did not present any evidence to contradict Penn Maritime’s evidence or to demonstrate that the CAPT HAGEN breached a duty of care. Without evidence of a breach, the court found the plaintiffs’ claims unsustainable.

The court granted Penn Maritime’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs could not prove the necessary elements of their negligence claim. As a result, all claims against Penn Maritime were dismissed with prejudice. 

Cruise Ship Overcrowding Claim Survives, but Warning Duty Sinks

Caloggero v. Carnival Corp., No. 23-cv-22938, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213935 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 25, 2024)

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida addressed a negligence lawsuit filed by Lynne Caloggero against Carnival Corporation. The case stemmed from an incident aboard the Carnival Celebration cruise ship on December 8, 2022, where Caloggero tripped on a stair while exiting a concert venue, the Center Stage area, during a Christmas music event. She alleged that overcrowding in the venue caused her to miss the step, leading to her injuries.

Caloggero’s lawsuit raised two claims: (1) negligence due to overcrowding in the concert venue and (2) failure to warn of the change in elevation. She argued that Carnival allowed the venue to become overcrowded, obscuring the stair and making it a hazard. She claimed that Carnival had notice of the overcrowding because several employees were present in the area, observing the crowd. Carnival denied the claims, arguing that the stair was an open and obvious condition, negating their duty to warn. They also maintained that there was no evidence to show they had actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition.

The court analyzed the evidence and testimony, focusing on whether Carnival had notice of the overcrowding and whether the stair posed an open and obvious hazard. Caloggero testified that the concert area was packed with people standing near the railings, which she claimed obscured the stair. However, Carnival countered that Caloggero admitted she was not looking at her feet, and her husband, who walked ahead of her, navigated the stair without incident. Carnival also pointed to the absence of prior reports of injuries involving the stair to argue they lacked notice of a dangerous condition.

The court ruled partially in favor of Carnival. It denied summary judgment on the
negligence claim related to overcrowding, finding that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Carnival had notice of the overcrowding and whether it created a hazard. However, the court granted summary judgment on the failure-to-warn claim, holding that the stair and the overcrowding were open and obvious conditions that did not require a warning.

Seaman’s Assault Claims Navigate Mixed Waters in Maritime Ruling

Brown v. APL Marine Servs., Ltd., No. 23-cv-01385, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195550
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2024)

Quentin Brown, a former seaman aboard the M/V President Wilson, brought a lawsuit against APL Marine Services and a co-worker, Yasin Berber, following allegations of harassment, sexual assault, retaliation, and emotional distress. Brown claimed that Berber subjected him to ongoing inappropriate behavior during a 2021 voyage, including winking, blocking his path, and making sexual gestures, culminating in a sexual assault in the ship’s engine room. Brown reported some of these incidents to colleagues but did not formally alert supervisors until after the alleged assault. When Brown did attempt to report the harassment, he encountered resistance and dismissive responses from ship officers, including his direct supervisor and the captain. He further alleged that APL retaliated against him after his complaints by requiring him to undergo a psychological evaluation and eliminating his position as a wiper.

The court addressed several claims in APL’s motion for summary judgment. On the Jones Act negligence claim, the court found that Brown failed to demonstrate that APL knew or should have known about Berber’s potential for misconduct. Since Brown’s prior complaints were vague and not communicated to supervisors in a way that would have alerted them to the risk, the court concluded the assault was not foreseeable and dismissed the negligence claim. However, the court allowed the unseaworthiness claim to proceed, noting that the severity of Berber’s alleged conduct could constitute a failure by APL to ensure a safe working environment and competent crew.

Brown also alleged retaliation under Title VII, arguing that APL’s actions after his
complaints, including requiring a psychological evaluation and terminating his position, were adverse and intended to dissuade him from pursuing his claims. The court found sufficient evidence to suggest a causal link between Brown’s complaints and these actions, allowing the retaliation claim to proceed. Finally, the court dismissed Brown’s emotional distress claims, concluding that the behavior of APL’s officers, while potentially inadequate, did not rise to the extreme and outrageous standard required for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, Brown failed to contest the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, leading the court to treat it as abandoned.

The court’s rulings underscored the challenges in proving employer liability for the actions of individual employees under maritime law. While Brown’s negligence and emotional distress claims were dismissed, his unseaworthiness and retaliation claims remain active, leaving key aspects of the case to be decided at trial.

Liftboat Capsizing Sparks Indemnity Battle, Waivers Hold Firm

In re Aries Marine Corp., Nos. 19-cv-10850, 19-cv-13138, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
210770 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2024)

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana resolved a dispute arising from the capsizing of the liftboat RAM XVIII in the Gulf of America, which result in personal injury claims against Aries Marine Corporation, the vessel owner. Aries sought indemnity from Fieldwood Energy, LLC, the charterer of the vessel, based on a master time charter agreement (the “Time Charter”). Additionally, Aries’ insurer, U.S. Specialty Insurance Company, intervened to seek recovery under subrogation rights. The central legal questions revolved around contractual obligations, including waivers of subrogation, indemnity provisions, and insurance requirements.

The court’s analysis primarily focused on the enforceability of the Time Charter’s waiver-of-subrogation clause, which barred Aries and its insurer from recovering damages from Fieldwood. The Time Charter explicitly required Aries and its insurers to waive subrogation rights against Fieldwood. Fieldwood argued that this clause, coupled with similar provisions in Aries’s insurance policy, precluded Aries and U.S. Specialty from seeking indemnity or reimbursement for costs related to the personal injury claims. Aries countered that Fieldwood’s failure to secure reciprocal indemnity agreements with third-party contractors, as required by the Time Charter, invalidated the waiver-of-subrogation provisions.

The court rejected Aries’s argument, holding that the waiver-of-subrogation provisions were enforceable. It found that Fieldwood had complied with its contractual obligations by executing indemnity agreements with its contractors, even though those agreements were later invalidated under Louisiana’s Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (LOAIA). The court reasoned that the Time Charter did not condition the enforceability of the waiver-of-subrogation clause on the legal validity of the third-party indemnity agreements. Furthermore, the court determined that Fieldwood’s alleged breach of the Time Charter did not negate Aries’s obligation to honor its waiver of subrogation.

The court also denied Aries’s separate motion to enforce indemnity obligations against Fieldwood. It ruled that Aries failed to demonstrate an entitlement to indemnity under the Time Charter’s provisions, particularly since those provisions excluded claims resulting from Aries’s gross negligence. The court noted that unresolved allegations of gross negligence against Aries precluded summary judgment on this issue.

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